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Abstract
This article deals with the issue of the immutability of God in Himself. What 
is meant by “immutability” and why God should (or must) be immutable? 
Doesn’t He –  whom Christians preach –  contradict His immutability by 
showing interest in man? These questions, taken by a number of philosophers 
and theologians have appeared more or less frequently throughout history. The 
article is devoted to the immutability of God as one and the Holy Trinity on 
the grounds of Christianity. The article quotes the thoughts of representatives 
from the Church in the West and in the East – Tertullian and Origen. This 
thought formed in an era when Trinitarian heresy flourished and had a sig-
nificant impact on the further development of theological reflection. Then the 
theological and philosophical position of Thomas Aquinas is taken into ac-
count as one who in his investigations on the nature of God used the compo-
nents of ancient Greek philosophy. 
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Introduction
The truth about the immutability of God has been the subject of debate 
among philosophers and theologians from different religious and philo-
sophical environments and systems. Adopted by Christianity, it has be-
come one of the attributes of God’s nature and an indispensable element 
of statements concerning His existence and activities. Christian theol-
ogy, which has been developing for many centuries, has not, however, 
supported this in a rash or reflection-free manner. Having at its disposal 
writings inspired by God, theology analyzed them using the capabilities 
of the human mind and referring to the entirety of its oeuvre. However, 
while Revelation seemed to show God as the One who changes his 
decisions or is subject to feelings (which clearly implied an assump-
tion about the changes taking place in Him), human thought as such 
persistently demanded someone perfect, totally different from what was 
created, and therefore unchangeable. As a consequence, the words from 
the Book of Malachi: “I, the LORD, do not change” (Malachi 3:6),1 un-
supported by relevant arguments turned out to be insufficient in them-
selves. The first centuries of Christianity faced allegations of polytheism 
and the mutability of God, which in the light of philosophical inves-
tigation seemed to be obvious to opponents. As a  result, Christianity 
cleaned and adapted the achievements of history that could serve the 
issue of approximating the nature of God to people. 
The article focuses on the immutability of God in Himself and the 
immutability of the Trinity in terms of Tertullian and Origen as the 
most creditable for this issue and the early representatives of the West-
ern and Eastern ideas of the Church, and Thomas Aquinas, who as 
a representative of scholasticism, utilized the resources of ancient phi-
losophy in his theological investigations.
1. Early Christian Reflection on God’s 
Immutability – Tertullian and Origen
In undertaking a discussion with pagan culture, philosophy, and Juda-
ism, Christianity defended the Gospel and defined its own concep-
tion of God and His relationship to the created order, showing Him 
1 For biblical quotation we use English Standard Version (2001).
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as quite different, but also personal, loving, and acting in the world.2 
Anti-trinitarian heresies, which appeared in the late second century 
were the stimulus that initiated the gradual development of Trinitar-
ian dogma.3 The pre-Nicene Fathers, while not yet using the classic 
formulation of one God in three Persons, expressed the mystery of the 
Trinity in different terminology and always combined this terminalogy 
with the Trinity’s interventions in the history of salvation. This line of 
thinking, perhaps too strongly emphasizing that the Son and the Holy 
Spirit are different from the Father though they nevertheless constitute 
unity with Him in His eternal being, caused anxiety in those anxious 
about monotheism.4 
The necessity of defense against pagans and Jews who saw Chris-
tians as worshippers of two gods led, at the end of the Second Century, 
to the foundation of Monarchianism, the above mentioned Trinitar-
ian heresy divided into adoptionist (dynamic) and modalistic (Unitar-
ian, patripassianism) Monarchianism.5 Monarchianism (Greek μονή 
• ἀρχή: the only – beginning) as such is a form of monotheism, which 
speaks of one beginning, one principle – God. Its adoptionist variation 
sees Jesus as only a man who was, however, elevated (adopted) by God 
to the dignity of God’s Son during Baptism. Representatives of this 
way of thinking are: Paul of Samosata (condemned at the Synod of 
Antioch in 268) and Photinus of Sirmium (condemned at the Synod of 
Antioch in 351). Modalistic monarchianism (Latin modus, mode, hence 
modalism) questions, on the other hand, the existence in God of “three 
eternally different Persons.” The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 
are only three different modes of manifesting of one and internally 
undifferentiated God. Noet, Praxeas, and probably Sabellius are the 
earliest representatives of this trend and the negation of all diversity in 
2 See T.G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi? (Does God Suffer?), przeł. J.  Majewski, 
Poznań 2003, p. 148 with note 4. See also: G. Strzelczyk, Traktat o Jezusie Chrystusie, 
Warszawa 2005 pp. 296–297 and 315–316 (Dogmatyka, 1).
3 B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów (Le Dieu du salut), vol. 1, Bóg zba-
wienia, tłum. P. Rak, Kraków 1999, p. 159; see also: J. D. Szczurek, Trójjedyny, Kraków 
1999, p. 165.
4 B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, p. 159; J. N. D. Kelly, Począt-
ki doktryny chrześcijańskiej (Early Christian Doctrines), przeł. J. Mrukówna, Warszawa 
1988, p. 90.
5 Cf. B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, p. 160; J. D. Szczurek, 
Trójjedyny, p. 174.
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God is visible in their approach, which finds confirmation in the words 
of Noet: “Christ Himself is the Father, and […] it was the Father who 
was born, suffered and died,”6 which expresses patripassianism. In this 
way “Unitarian” trends were softened with time.7 
Faced with this deformed picture of Christianity the Church could 
not remain indifferent. Tertullian (c. 160–225) in the West, and Origen 
(c. 185–254)8 in the East, greatly helped the development of Trinitarian 
thought responding to individual accusations and overthrowing them.
Tertullian came from North Africa and was a  lawyer and theolo-
gian whose thought was marked by stoicism9 and who in 207 joined 
the Montanists. He was also the first important Christian author who 
wrote in Latin and contributed greatly to Western thought by develop-
ing Trinitarian and Christological terminology. 
Adversus Praxean is the work of Tertullian directed against Monar-
chianism, which is also “the first treatise of purely speculative Trinitari-
an theology.” Responding to complaints, Tertullian refers mainly to the 
Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, but confronting “evidence 
of faith with the requirements of reason”10 is not alien to him. The ac-
cusations that Praxeas makes concerns the worshipping of two or three 
Gods and his views are summed up in the assertion that there is only 
one Lord, the Creator of the World, the Father, who is Jesus Christ 
Himself.11 Although Tertullian attached great importance to monothe-
ism and referred to the loneliness of God,12 he also argued that the 
6 Hipolit, Contra Noetum, 1. See also: P. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible 
God, Oxford 2006, p. 94.
7 See B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, p. 160–161; J. D. Szczu-
rek, Trójjedyny, p. 174–175; 
See also: H. Pietras, Wprowadzenie, in: Trójca Święta, Tertulian, Przeciw Prakse-
aszowi, przeł. E. Buszewicz; Hipolit, Przeciw Noetosowi, przeł. S. Kalinkowski, wstęp 
i oprac. H. Pietras, Kraków 1997, pp. 10–18.
8 Dates after: J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 91 and 102.
9 J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 93, reminds us of this when 
he speaks of the “materialistic language” of Tertullian. See also: H. Pietras, Orygenes, 
Kraków 2001, pp. 34–35.
10 B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, pp. 167–168; regarding iden-
tification of Praxseas see: H. Pietras, Wprowadzenie, in: Trójca Święta, p. 12.
11 See Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, III, 1 and I, 1.
12 J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 91; J. D. Szczurek, Trójj-
edyny, p. 177; In order to demonstrate the unity of God, Tertullian used the idea of 
monarchy, but understood differently even by Christians themselves. In Adversus 
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existence of the Son of God did not contradict unity.13 The Son of God 
comes from the substance of the Father just as the Holy Spirit does 
and together they “constitute oneness and not the one, as is said: I and 
the Father are one, regarding the unity of substance, not singularity of 
number.”14 Their unity cannot be reduced to a mathematical calculus, 
as in the neuter case (Latin unum) used in the words of Jesus means 
“unity, likeness, communication” and so the identity of the substance, 
rather than the singular (this could be rendered by unus, one).15 The 
Word, like Wisdom and Reason, has always existed in God, becoming 
the Son at the time when it was pronounced, by God the Creator in 
the process of creation.16 Tertullian is also the first among the Latinists 
who, speaking of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit as Persons, uses the 
word trinitas, stating that God is a Trinity.17
Thomas Weinandy notes that Tertullian’s position on feelings, and 
thus the suffering and impassibility of God and the associated potential 
changes, is marked by a certain tension. To understand it one should 
look at it through the prism of the goodness of God, His eternal and 
basic attribute, which He uses in a rational manner that implies that 
He is perfect. According to Tertullian the goodness of God demands 
judging evil and therefore displaying feelings (including negative ones 
such as anger) without which He could not be good, since “kindness is 
the ‘mother’ of all feelings.” Without kindness He would not be a true 
God. Thus, on the one hand, He is good in Himself, and on the other, 
His goodness “is expressed appropriately to changes in the created or-
der.” As One who is eternally and perfectly good, He does not change 
His emotional states and remains unchangeable. On the other hand, 
the way of expressing His goodness, as well as how man experiences it, 
Praxean, III, 2 he states how he understands this term. See. H. Pietras, Wprowadzenie, 
in: Trójca Święta, p. 10.
13 G. Strzelczyk, Traktat o Jezusie Chrystusie, p. 313.
14 Tertulian, Adversus Praxean, XXV, 1.
15 Tertulian, Adversus Praxean, XXII, 10–11; J.  N.  D.  Kelly, Początki doktryny 
chrześcijańskiej, p. 93; H. Pietras, Wprowadzenie, in: Trójca Święta, pp. 18–19; see also: 
G. Strzelczyk, Traktat o Jezusie Chrystusie, p. 314.
16 Tertulian, Adversus Praxean, V–VII; J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześci-
jańskiej, p. 91; see also: B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, pp. 173–175; 
J. D. Szczurek, Trójjedyny, p. 177.
17 Cf. Tertulian, Adversus Praxean, III, XI, XII; J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny 
chrześcijańskiej, p. 92.
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is variable, such as anger against the sinner, or mercy towards the re-
pentant. One cannot, as Marcion18 Tertullian’s adversary on the subject, 
view God through the prism of man, assign Him the same nature, and 
conclude that He is mortal just because it is said that He can express 
negative feelings. “God has feelings in a divine way,” and not in a hu-
man and changeable way.19
In terms of Tertullian, God is immutable also because He is beyond 
time. That which exists in time is subject to change. But God is eternal 
and the essence of eternity is not to be subject to loss.20 Eternity, as Ter-
tullian says, “is not capable of change, since, being an eternity, it cannot 
in any way be subject to change.”21 It does not have time, being itself “all 
time” and “whatever happens [in it], does not change.”22 So God in His 
eternity cannot become more or less perfect, and if He works, He is not 
subject to the same effect. As eternally perfect and good He exists without 
beginning and without end, in eternity that is not subject to change.23 
By analyzing the thought of Tertullian, Thomas Weinandy notes 
that, despite certain ambiguities and misunderstandings in his thoughts, 
Tertullian advocates maintaining two biblical truths – one about the 
total otherness of God and the other about His kindness toward crea-
tures. Seeing Him as wise, good, and eternal, he concludes that as such 
He is ontically immutable and impassible (does not experience changes 
of emotional states).24
Joseph Hallman25 has a slightly different perspective on the views of 
Tertullian than Thomas Weinandy. He argues that Tertullian’s position 
18 Tertulian, Adversus Marcionem, II, 16.
19 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp. 175–180; see also: J. Hallman, The De-
scent of God, Minneapolis 1991, pp. 51–52.
20 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p.  180; J. Hallman, The Descent of God, 
p. 61; On the subject of eternity see: K. Rahner, H. Vorgrimler, Mały słownik teologiczny 
(Kleines Theologisches Wörterbuch), przeł. T. Mieszkowski, P. Pachciarek, Warszawa 1987, 
ref. ‘wieczność’, pp. 541–542; J. D. Szczurek, Trójjedyny, pp. 251–254.
21 Tertulian, Adversus Hermogenem, 12; quoted after: T.  G.  Weinandy, Czy Bóg 
cierpi?, p. 180.
22 Tertulian, Adversus Marcionem, I, 8.
23 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 180; see also: J. Hallman, The Descent of 
God, pp. 59–61.
24 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp. 180–181.
25 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, note 104, pp.  181–184 analyzes J. Hallman’s 
interpretation of Tertulian’s thoughts showing what is missing in it and the erroneous 
conclusions.
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is inconsistent both in terms of God and the Incarnation because he 
adopted the assumptions of Greek philosophy. These assumptions 
made it impossible for him to keep an entirely biblical perspective.26 
According to Joseph Hallman, Tertullian defends the idea of 
a changing and passible God in De carne Christi, thus explaining the 
possibility of the Incarnation, but later contradicts himself in Adver-
sus Praxean (XXVII, 13).27 Considering the question of how the Word 
became flesh Tertullian also asks whether “[It] turned into the body 
(transfiguratio) or put it on.” In response, he states: “Certainly It put 
it on. Besides, we must believe that God, as eternal, is immutable and 
does not transform. Transformation is, after all, the destruction of the 
previous state.” But as noted by Thomas Weinandy, transformation un-
derstood in such a way refers only to what was created while in the con-
text of the Incarnation it denotes a new way of existence for God who 
always remains the same.28 By becoming man, the Son of God does not 
“change” Himself and so does not cease to be God. He remains true 
God and true man: “No doubt both individual substances retain their 
individual distinctiveness [...]. Here we see the two states not mixed, 
but united in one person of God and man: Jesus.”29 The unchanging 
God can become a man without changing.30 
In the East in Alexandria, Origen like Tertullian was influenced by 
the intellectual currents of his era and benefited from the philosophi-
cal achievements of history hence his reflection on the mystery of the 
Trinity is marked by Middle Platonism. He was also familiar with the 
first heresies – Monarchianism and Adoptionism.31 Moreover, in addi-
tion to Plotinus, he is regarded as “the most versatile mind of his time.” 
26 Cf. J. Hallman, The Descent of God, p. 62 and p. 66. 
27 Cf. J. Hallman, The Descent of God, p. 63 with note 38 and pp. 65–66, where the 
author says that Tertulian was not able to reconcile changeability of the Son in Incar-
nation with immutability of God; T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, note 104, p. 183.
28 Tertulian, Adversus Praxean, XXVII, 6–7; T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, note 
104, p. 183.
29 Cf. Tertulian, Adversus Praxean, XXVII, pp. 7–13; B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, His-
toria dogmatów, vol. 1, p. 180.
30 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, note 104, pp. 182–183.
31 Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 102; J. D. Szczurek, Trój-
jedyny, p. 178; B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, p. 192; T. G. Weinan-
dy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 170; H. Pietras, Wprowadzenie, in: Orygenes, O zasadach, przekł. 
i oprac. S. Kalinkowski, Kraków 1996, p. 10 and pp. 31–32; H. Pietras, Origenes, pp. 35–36.
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Although, according to general opinion, the Second Council of Con-
stantinople (553) condemned Origen32 and because of this he is inscribed 
in our consciousness as a heretic. A number of authors (e.g. Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, Henri de Lubac) currently highlight the orthodoxy of his 
faith (the exception is the theory of the preexistence of souls), and the 
Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) quotes him eight times.33 
The categories of Middle Platonism were used by Origen in his re-
flection on the Holy Trinity, so God the Father was seen by him as the 
Monad, the One, Reason, and the Source, “from which all spiritual be-
ings, and all understanding originate.”34 Only he was God in the strict 
sense, only he was not begotten and, what he strongly emphasized, was 
immaterial,35 The Son was His faithful semblance and mediator, His own 
eternal act of the Father who is outside time and unchanging.36 Although 
His divinity was derived and He was called ‘the second’ God, it cannot be 
disputed that as such He was indeed God.37 The Holy Spirit is, in turn, 
“the highest of beings that the Father created through Christ.”38 
Characteristic in the thought of Origen was the perception of the 
Father, the Son, and the Spirit as eternally existing, separately as “three 
Persons” (ὑποστάσεις). Speaking of them he used the term ὑπόστασις, 
derived from Stoicism, which was then used interchangeably with οὐσία, 
32 F. Diekamp, Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten im sechsten Jahrhundert und das 
fünfte allgemeine Concil, Münster 1899, pp. 66–138. He showed, however, that Origen 
was condemned at the request of Justinian even before the formal opening of the de-
bates of the council, hence the condemnation is not included in the set of his files, 
Cf. Constantinople II (553) in DSp  1,  294–295 anathematism 11; Constantinople III 
(680–681) in DSp 1, 310–311; and Nicaea II (787) in DSp 1, 334–335.
33 Cf. B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, p.  184; J. N. D. Kelly, 
Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 102; H. Pietras, Wprowadzenie, in: Orygenes, O za-
sadach, p.  7; see also: S. Kalinkowski, Wstęp, in: Pamfil z Cezarei, Obrona Origenesa, 
Rufin z Akwilei, O sfałszowaniu pism Origenesa, tłum., wstęp i oprac. S. Kalinkowski, 
Kraków 1996, pp. 5–8 (Źródła Myśli Teologicznej, 3)
34 Origen, De principiis, I, 1, 6. 
35 J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 103; J. D. Szczurek, Trójjedy-
ny, p. 178; B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, p. 188; Origen, De principiis, 
I, 1, 1–4; Origen, Contra Celsum, VI, 64.
36 Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 103; Origen, De princi-
piis, I, 2, 4.
37 Origen, Contra Celsum, V, 39 and VII, 57; see also: J. N. D. Kelly, Początki dok-
tryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 103 and p. 105; B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 
1, p. 188.
38 J. D. Szczurek, Trójjedyny, p. 178–179.
Immutability of God in Christian Terms 75
the Platonic term. Both meant actual existence (as opposed to what ex-
ists merely in the mind), what a thing is, but Origen began to use the first 
one to point to an individual being, an individual existence. Therefore, he 
saw an error of modalism in distinguishing the Father, the Son, and the 
Spirit only in thought (conceptually) and not in terms of numbers. For 
Origen Three Divine Persons, though in fact separate, were united.39
In Contra Celsum Origen states that God is not part of being, on 
the contrary, that “being is involved in God.” So one cannot put him 
on par with what is created. God is different and the difference is based 
on the act of creation. Moreover, by nature, as being immaterial and 
pure substance, He is “stable and unchanging” hence “movement is not 
[His] feature.”40 The argument put forth by Origen for permanence and 
immutability was mainly against the Stoics, for whom everything that 
existed had to be material and therefore subject to change and destruc-
tion, including God.41
Like Tertullian, Origen appears to be inconsistent. On the one hand 
he defends God’s immutability and impassibility, acknowledging that 
God’s nature is not subject to change and all passions are alien to it.42 On 
the other hand, however, he talks about His feelings – compassion, pity, 
and pain, which caused the Son of God to become man, and the emo-
tions and suffering that accompany the Father Himself when He pities 
people and “puts Himself in a situation where he could not find Himself 
because of the greatness of His nature.”43 So not only the Son suffers 
and not only in his humanity, since suffering includes, as a motive of the 
Incarnation, also His “divine status.”44 Origen’s intuition coincides with 
the intuition of Tertullian here – we should take two seemingly con-
tradictory truths: of the impassibility and passibility of God. Scripture, 
39 Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, pp.  103–104; B. Sesboüé, 
J. Wolinski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, p. 199.
40 Origen, Contra Celsum, VI, 64; T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 171; H. Pie-
tras, Orygenes, p. 35.
41 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 172; Origen, Contra Celsum, I, 21.
42 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 171 and p. 173.
43 Origen, In Ezechielem homiliae, VI, 6; T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 172; 
see also: W. Hryniewicz, Pascha Chrystusa w dziejach człowieka i wszechświata. Zarys 
chrześcijańskiej teologii paschalnej, vol. 3, Lublin 1991, p.  269 with note 111, where the 
author quotes a fragment from In Ezechielem homiliae, VI, 6 and states that it would be 
a mistake to “consider Origen an advocate of the so called patripassianism.” 
44 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 173.
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when speaking of any (positive and negative) feelings in God, must be 
interpreted metaphorically because one cannot look at God as a man 
and assign him “human affection.”45 The feelings, of which the Bible 
speaks, do not mean “changes in emotional state,” but “predicate aspects 
of God’s immutable passionate love for humankind.”46
Origen was the first to philosophically and biblically justify that the 
Son was not created at the beginning of time but is begotten and eter-
nal.47 His reasoning was based on the assumption that God is immutable 
because He exists in eternity. This eternity, however, is not related to the 
passing of time. Begetting or creating the Son therefore could not occur 
at some particular moment because that would be associated with time. 
Thus, God the Father would not have always been the Father, and would 
have to only become Him, and this would entail a change that in relation 
to God is not acceptable. The Son, in turn, could not be called the perfect 
image of the Father, because he would not be eternal just like He is. Fur-
thermore, assuming the begetting of the Son at a given moment in time, 
one could ask why it did not happen at an earlier or later time.48 Putting 
an end to discussions of this type, Origen says: “The Father is the source 
and origin of the Son and the Holy Spirit and in the whole Trinity we 
shouldn’t anticipate anything earlier or later.”49 The Father begets the Son 
eternally and it is a continuous relationship of origin, lasting even after 
the Incarnation.50 It should also be noted that Origen does not speak yet 
about consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. For he always presents 
their unity as a “unity in love, will and action.”51
Origen was one of the first to analyze the issue of the mutual re-
lationship of the Logos and the humanity of Jesus in the Incarnation. 
Here was based the soteriological premise – human salvation is pos-
sible only when the Logos is truly united with humanity (through the 
45 Origen, Contra Celsum, IV, 72.
46 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 175.
47 H. Pietras, Wprowadzenie, in: Orygenes, O zasadach, p. 33; H. Pietras, Orygenes, 
p. 33; J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, p. 104; B. Sesboüé, J. Wolinski, 
Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, p. 189.
48 Cf. H. Pietras, Orygenes, pp. 36–38; see: Origen, De principiis, I, 2, 2 and IV, 4, 1, 
where Origen says that the birth of the Son does not mean the expanding of God, as is 
the case with man. Origen, De principiis, II, 2, 1.
49 Origen, De principiis, II, 2, 1.
50 H. Pietras, Orygenes, p. 38.
51 Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej, pp. 104–105.
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soul).52 This must be the unification of the ontological character, but 
Origen does not explain of what it would consist. There is no doubt, 
however, that Jesus Christ has in mind two kinds of unmixed and un-
altered natures53 – divine and human, which are united in Him as a sin-
gle entity so that it is possible to apply to him the words such as “the 
Son of God died.”54 Explaining to Celsus that God is “indestructible, 
noncomposite, simple and indivisible,” and supporting his conviction 
of His immutability with the words of Scripture: “I, the LORD do not 
change” (Malachi 3:6), Origen refutes the allegations that the Incar-
nated God had to change (e.g. from good to evil). He – “immutable by 
nature – descends among people through His providence and care for 
human affairs,”55 and the mere fact of His becoming fully human while 
remaining fully divine, is a mystery impossible to explain “even for all 
heavenly powers.”56
2. Immutability of God and the Trinity  
in Terms of Thomas Aquinas
The development of philosophical culture in medieval Europe was 
made possible as a result of the renewed interest in non-Christian phi-
losophy – Arab, Jewish, and Greek (mainly Aristitelianism).57 This was 
followed by the establishment of new universities and religious orders, 
such as, the Dominicans and Franciscans, from which emerged such 
thinkers as Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, and John Duns Scot. The 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries also led to rational cognitive tenden-
cies, which have their resonance in later centuries.58 
52 G. Strzelczyk, Traktat o Jezusie Chrystusie, p. 318; see: Origen, De principiis, II, 6, 3.
53 Nature for Origen is what determines the identity of being, thus deciding on 
the scope of its activities. It is already an ontological category. G. Strzelczyk, Traktat 
o Jezusie Chrystusie, pp. 318–320; see: Origen, De principiis, I, 2, 1 and II, 6, 2; Origen, 
Contra Celsum, III, 28.
54 Cf. G. Strzelczyk, Traktat o Jezusie Chrystusie, pp. 317–321; B. Sesboüé, J. Wo-
linski, Historia dogmatów, vol. 1, pp. 201–202. 
55 Origen, Contra Celsum, IV, 14 and I, 21.
56 Origen, De principiis, II, 6, 2.
57 Cf. M. Gogacz, Elementarz metafizyki, Warszawa 1987, p. 141; M. Krąpiec, T. Że-
leźnik, Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji: ogólna teoria I wybór tekstów, Lublin 1966, p. 58, 187.
58 M. Krąpiec, T. Żeleźnik, Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji, p. 59.
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Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) brought a kind of 
revolution to philosophical thought.59 Taking into account the thought 
of Aristotle,60 applying it to Christianity, and brokering a new concept 
of being and man, they exerted a tremendous influence on its very core. 
It was not an easy task because, in accordance with common belief, 
one should submit to the opinion that “to know the truth is the work 
of the joint research in different times and different places.” Therefore 
Thomas Aquinas, despite the “novelty” of his teaching, original ideas, 
and formulations, still referred to the recognized and “existing” author-
ities such as Aristotle, Boethius, and St. Augustine, interpreting their 
views through the prism of his own observations and thus confirming 
his concepts using their thought.61
Thomas Aquinas’ accomplishment is undoubtedly introducing 
a new understanding of being – being as existing. Thus so far unno-
ticed, existence became “a factor in the actualization of a particular be-
ing, that a being is truly real.”62 Just as the biblical and patristic tradi-
tion concluded that God is omnipotent, all-perfect, eternal, immutable, 
and impassible, and His very nature also requires these attributes, for 
Thomas Aquinas “the nature of God is existing, that He is ipsum esse 
(‘existence itself ’), and thus actus purus (‘pure act’).”63 Essence and exist-
ence, the same in God, are thus the basis of His immutability.64
59 A short biography of Thomas Aquinas and a discussion of various insights into 
his thought in: M. Gogacz, Elementarz metafizyki, pp. 144–151.
60 Cf. A. Baron, Neoplatońska idea Boga, Kraków 2005, p. 47.
61 Cf. M. Krąpiec, T. Żeleźnik, Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji, pp. 62–63.
62 M. Krąpiec, T. Żeleźnik, Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji, pp. 64–65.
63 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 209; Thomas Aquinas, S. th., I, 3, 4 and on 
the difference between existing of (immutable) God and (mutable) creatures I, 9, 2; 
J. D. Szczurek, Trójjedyny, pp. 228–230 says that Thomas Aquinas understands God as 
self-contained existence (ipsum esse subsistens), in which every other existence partici-
pates. He also points out that in the Polish language the term “existence” (esse) is richer 
than “being” and renders Aquinas’ definition in a better way as the definition relates to 
the “act of true, fulfilled continuance beyond nothingness, i.e., the content of the infini-
tive “to exist.” Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp. 210–212. Pure act in neoplatonic 
thinking – see A. Baron, Neoplatońska idea Boga, pp. 259–317. See also: W. Breuning, 
Nauka o  Bogu, przekł. J.  Fenrychowa Kraków 1999, pp.  92–94 (Podręcznik Teologii 
Dogmatycznej, traktat II); E. Gilson, Bóg i filozofia, przeł. M. Kochanowska, Warszawa 
1961, p. 62 and 67; L. Łysień, Bóg, rozum, wiara: problematyka filozofii Boga od Talesa 
z Miletu do G. W. F. Hegla, Kraków 2003, pp. 63–64, 68.
64 Z. Nerczuk, Komentarz do Kwestii 10. O wieczności Boga, in: Tomasz z Akwinu, 
Summa teologii. Traktat o Bogu (entries 1–26).
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God, as “the first being” (primum ens),65 pure existence, and pure 
act, is the most real and perfect, because nothing is missing in the way 
of His excellence, He does not realize any potency.66 Thus, as an all-
perfect and free from movement, He is immutable. This immutability, 
as Thomas Weinandy points out, however, is not static or indifferent, 
but active and dynamic, resulting from the fact that as a pure act “He 
cannot become ontically more in the act.” His immutability cannot be 
then compared with the immutability of a rock, because a rock is sim-
ply static and inert, and He is so dynamic [...] that no change could 
make Him more active.”67 “God then is supremely immutable because 
He is supremely in act.”68 This distinguishes him from the “prime mat-
ter” which, also being immutable, is immutable on the basis of being 
totally in potency, thus having “the highest degree of passivity and will-
ingness to accept.”69 It should be emphasized also that immutability in 
reference to God in Thomas Aquinas refers to the ontological level and 
is absolute immutability, which excludes any changes. This is “meta-
physical immutability because God can neither begin nor cease to exist; 
physical immutability, as He cannot change internally or yield to an ac-
tion of an external cause; intentional immutability, because He cannot 
expand or limit His knowledge, and finally moral immutability, because 
He cannot change His free choices.”70
The issue of immutability is also tied to the topic of emotions in 
God. Thomas Aquinas denies their existence, although he does so by 
negating the existence of a changing emotional process in God, which 
is characteristic of humans.71 As a result, feelings (e.g. joy, love) exist in 
65 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, S. th., I,  2,  3; Z.  Nerczuk, Komentarz do Kwestii 10. 
O wieczności Boga, p. 540.
66 Thomas Aquinas, S. th., I, 9, 1.
67 T. G. Weinandy, Does God change? The Word’s Becoming in the Incarnation, Pe-
tersham 1985, pp.  78–79; quoted after: T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp.  215–216; 
D. Oko, Doskonale obojętny? Zarys współczesnej krytyki Tomaszowego pojmowania nie-
zmienności Boga, ”Analecta Cracoviensia” 27 (2005), p. 62.
68 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp. 213–215.
69 Cf. Z. Nerczuk, Komentarz do Kwestii 10. O wieczności Boga, p. 542.
70 D. Oko, Doskonale obojętny?, p. 62; S. Ziemiański, Teologia naturalna. Filozo-
ficzna problematyka Boga, Kraków 1995, pp. 306–307; see also: I. Różycki, Dogmatyka 
katolicka, vol. 1, pp. 171–172.
71 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp.  292–294 also opposes addressing some 
concepts to God (such as “suffering”), which might suggest that He is subject to some 
emotional changes.
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God, but speaking of them one should pay attention to the fact that 
God has them within His unchanging nature (and not within an emo-
tional process), as such they do not bring His perfection into question. 
Thus, since God is pure act, His feelings are completely in the act. For 
example, to say that God is love means that he is “pure love in act, and 
thus absolute passion in act.”72
Since these philosophical considerations are based on human reason 
rather than on revelation, they concern God as one (reason alone has 
not yet reached this, that God is a Trinity of Persons) and the question 
of God’s immutability if framed within His nature and attributes. For 
a full picture of the immutability of God one should look deeper into 
the nature of the Trinity.73
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit exist “by themselves as dif-
ferent subjects” and are referred to as “different persons solely within 
references to themselves.” Their mutual relationship then is what dif-
ferentiates them.74 The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit exist “by 
themselves as different subjects” and are referred to as “different persons 
solely within reference to themselves.” Their mutual relationship then 
is what differentiates them.75 Being self-contained, only in mutual re-
lationship, the Divine Persons are relations in act, and as relation, self-
contained in act, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are unchanging.76 And 
again, immutability is not a result of their static character or inertia, but 
a consequence of the lack of relational potency, whose realization would 
be necessary for the persons of the Trinity to become more relational. 
Being completely self-contained relations in act, completely dynamic 
and active, They cannot become even more dynamic and active.77
These considerations lead to the conclusion that Thomas Aquinas 
anchored immutability of God on three assumptions. The first one 
72 Cf. T.  G.  Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp.  219–220; Thomas Aquinas, S. th., 
I, 20, 1.
73 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 200 and 209.
74 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 201 with note 3; Thomas Aquinas, S. th., 
I, 29, 4 and I, 28, 1. See also: C. J. Hefele, H. Leclercq, Histoire des Conciles d’après les 
documents originaux, tome 3, première partie, Paris 1909, p. 311 nn.), Cf. J. D. Szczu-
rek, Trójjedyny, pp.  203–208; see also: C.  Bartnik, Dogmatyka katolicka, pp.  219–222; 
F. Courth, Bóg trójjedynej miłości, pp. 225–229.
75 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 203.
76 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp. 206–207.
77 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, pp. 207–208.
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indicates God’s possession of present existence in the highest degree, 
and the simultaneous lack of potency. Transition from potency to act 
is therefore not possible, thus providing a guarantee of immutability. 
Then, since the transition from potency to act is a change, and takes 
place only in complex beings, it does not apply to God, because He 
is simple being.78 Finally, God, as an ontically perfect Being, does not 
change, because He has all the positive properties. Any change would 
suggest His imperfection and the need to “purchase” what He lacks, 
that is, the transition from potency to act.79 
Aquinas’ view of the immutability of God cannot be seen only 
through the prism of the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover, although he 
used Aristotelian philosophy (he adopted Aristotles definition of mo-
tion, time, and space) and is usually associated with it. Please note how-
ever, that the philosophy of Stagirite was reinterpreted by him in the 
light of Christian Revelation, thereby transforming the idea of self-
thinking Thought in “the One who is.”80 
What undoubtedly connects Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas on 
the issue of the immutability of God is that they consider Him to be 
fully realized, and thus immutable and therefore eternal.81 Jacek Salij 
lists four elements, however, which differentiates both philosophers on 
the issue of the immutability of God. First of all, Aristotle did not 
know the truth about creation82 hence the Unmoved Mover serves him 
78 Thomas Aquinas, S. th., I, 3, 7 argues that God is a simple being, among others 
because He is not the body, He does not consist of matter and form, subject and ac-
cidents, nature and difference, and the essence and existence and the nature and the 
subject are one in Him. He is also the first being, the first efficient cause and the 
existence, which also speaks for His simplicity. See Z. Nerczuk, Komentarz do Kwestii 
10. O wieczności Boga, p.  543. Simple being in neoplatonic thinking –  see A. Baron, 
Neoplatońska idea Boga, pp. 137–139.
79 Cf. J. Życiński, Bóg Abrahama i Whiteheada, pp. 205–207; D. Oko, Doskonale 
obojętny?, p. 61.
80 Cf. E.  Gilson, Bóg i  filozofia, p.  61; Z.  Nerczuk, Komentarz do Kwestii 10. 
O wieczności Boga, p. 538.
81 Cf. Z. Nerczuk, Komentarz do Kwestii 10. O wieczności Boga, p. 538.
82 Thomas Aquinas, referring to the creation of the world, introduces a Christian 
theme to the Aristotelian argumentation. Considering the issue of change caused by 
an external factor, he comes to the conclusion that creation by definition is mutable, as 
it was called into existence by an eternal being (God) and is dependent on Him in its 
existence (if God did not keep the world in existence, it would cease to exist). Z. Ner-
czuk, Komentarz do Kwestii 10. O wieczności Boga, p. 546.
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to explain the eternal motion of celestial bodies. Secondly, he did not 
know that He works on a voluntary basis and gives existence to what 
exists. Thirdly, the Unmoved Mover in Aristotle’s system is a supreme 
being, the most important (because it protects against degradation in-
to chaos) and transcendent, but also one of the many elements of the 
“wholeness of being.” So the philosopher knows nothing “about His 
real ubiquity.” Fourth, although he is pure act, “he is wholly immersed 
in himself and beyond propelling the universe in movement, he is not 
involved in anything which is external to him.”83
God is pure act and works as such. Only He has the ability to invoke 
things into existence.84 Being actus purus, He is unchangeable, which 
does not prevent action. On the contrary, His constant – because fully 
realized – power, allows Him to create and it is precisely the necessary 
condition. God’s action does not include any transition from potency 
to act, hence it is pure act, and as such also applies to the act of cre-
ation.85 Recognizing God as mutable destroys His ontological distinc-
tion, bringing Him to “the most perfect being among many beings,” 
while between Him and what was created there is a great difference.86 
The “supernatural” action of God in the created order should not be 
understood as God’s entry in this order in such a way that he becomes 
just another element acting in it. He would then, of necessity, be subject 
to change. His “supernatural” activity means that He “remains onto-
logically distinct from the created order as the Wholly Other, bringing 
about a change in the created order by relating a  thing or person to 
himself as the Wholly Other in a new manner.”87
83 Cf. J.  Salij, Jak nieskończenie doskonały i  niezmienny Bóg może interesować się 
swoim stworzeniem?, p. 6.
84 Only God exists by Himself, which is the condition of creation. If other entities 
have been gifted by Him with such a possibility, they would have the same power as 
He to exist as pure act. It is impossible, because they would then be an eternal God. 
T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, note 63, p. 232.
85 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 229, pp. 232–233 and note 64 and note 69, 
pp. 238–239.
86 T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, p. 239 and note 70; J. D. Szczurek, Trójj-
edyny, p. 342.
87 Cf. T. G. Weinandy, Czy Bóg cierpi?, note 61, pp. 230–231.
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